Apollo experience report:  The cryogenic storage system by Chandler, W. A. et al.
d73- a 5 m  
NASA TECHNICAL NOTE NASA TN D-7288 
a0 ce 
N 
APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT - 
THE CRYOGENIC STORAGE SYSTEM 
by Willium A.  Chundler, Robert R. Rice, 
and Robert K .  Allgeier, Jr. 
Munned Spucecrafi Center 
Houston, Texus 77058 
N A T I O N A L  AERONAUTICS A N D  SPACE ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON,  D. C. JUNE 1973 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19730017162 2020-03-11T19:09:13+00:00Z
1. Report No. 
NASA TN D-7288 
I 4. Title and Subtitle 
2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. 
APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT I THE CRYOGENIC STORAGE SYSTEM 
7. Author(s) 
William A. Chandler, Robert R. Rice, 
and Robert K. Allgeier, Jr., MSC 
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
Houston, Texas 77058 
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washington, D. C, 20546 
5. Report Date 
8. Performing Organization Report No. 
MSC S-321 
10. Work Unit No. 
914 -1 1 -1 0 -00 -72 
11. Contract or Grant No. 
13. Type of Report and Period Covered 
Technical Note 
14. Sponsoring Agency Code 
17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s1) 18. Distribution Statement 
* Apollo 
* Cryogenic Storage 
' Hydrogen 
Oxygen 
Supercritical Pressures 
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this pagel 21.  NO. of pages 22. Rice+ 
None None 17 $3.00 
; 
15. Supplementary Notes 
The MSC Director waived the use of the International System of Units (SI) for this Apollo 
Experience Report because, in his judgment, the use of SI Units would impair the usefulness 
of the report o r  result in excessive cost. 
16. Abstract 
A comprehensive review of the design, development, and flight history of the Apollo cryogenic 
storage system and of selected components within the system is presented in this report. In 
particular, discussions are presented on the developmental history of the pressure vessels, 
heaters, insulation, and selected components. Flight experience and operational difficulties 
are discussed in detail to provide definition of the problems and applicable corrective actions. 
. 
* For sale by the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151 
CONTENTS 
Section Page 
SUMMARY.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
INTRODUCTION.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 .  
Cryogenic Storage System Power Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 
System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 
DEVELOPMENTAL DIFFICULTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5 
Pressure Vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5 
Heaters and Fans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
Insulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7 
Outer Shells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7 
FLIGHT-HARDWARE PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
Apollo9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
Apollo 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9 
Apollo 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 
CONCLUDING REMARKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 
iii 
Figure 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
FIGURES 
Apollo 13 CSS configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
The CSS configuration. redesigned for Apollo 14 . . . . . . . . . .  
The CSS configuration. redesigned for Apollo 15  . . . . . . . . . .  
Apollo 13 tank designs 
(a) Oxygentank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
(b) Hydrogen tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Schematic of the hydrogen tank automatic pressure-control 
system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Fluid temperature (02) electrical connector . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Redesigned Apollo 14 oxygen tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Page 
3 
3 
4 
5 
5 
9 
12 
12 
iv 
APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
THE CRYOGEN I C  STORAGE SYSTEM 
Igeier, J r. 
~ SUMMARY 
The Apollo cryogenic storage system was designed, developed, and qualified to 
supply the fuel-cell reactants (hydrogen and oxygen) and metabolic oxygen to the three- 
man flight crew for 14 days. Supercritical storage was selected because it eliminated 
the need for  development of venting and quantity-gaging systems for two-phase fluids 
in a low-gravity environment. Problems occurred in the early stages of this program 
in the development of pressure vessels, insulation, fans, heaters, and components; 
these problems resulted in changes in sources, concepts, processes, methods, or  
quality control. Later, problems developed in flight hardware that resulted in rede- 
sign and requalification of flight hardware. However, the development of this system, 
as was the case with many others in the Apollo Program, resulted in significant con- 
tributions to the advancement of the state of the art. 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
During an Apollo mission, the cryogenic storage system (CSS) of the service 
module provides (1) oxygen for the flight crew and (2) oxygen as the oxidizer and hydro- 
gen as the fuel for  electrical power generation in the fuel-cell power generation system 
(PGS). 
for the CSS as it interfaces with other command and service module subsystems. Em- 
phasis is placed on significant problems encountered during development and flight test- 
ing of the hardware and on appropriate corrective action applied to these problems. 
This report presents a discussion of the functional and physical requirements 
I 
I DES I GN CONS I DERATl ONS 
The fluid requirements for the CSS were established from a compilation of the 
PGS and environmental control system (ECS) flow profiles. The PGS imposed signifi- 
cant reactant-purity requirements and the ECS imposed the highest system flow rates. 
The storage containers for the CSS a r e  double-walled, vacuum -jacketed storage con- 
ta iners  called dewars, named after the inventor Sir James Dewar, a Scottish physicist 
and chemist. Each hydrogen dewar contains 28.14 pounds of usable hydrogen and each 
oxygen dewar contains 323.45 pounds of usable oxygen when maximum fill conditions 
are met. In the four-dewar configuration, therefore, the total quantities were 
56.28 pounds of usable hydrogen and 646.9 pounds of usable oxygen. The hydrogen is 
dedicated for fuel-cell use, and approximately 450 pounds of oxygen of the 646-pound 
total is consumed by the fuel cells. Nominally, ECS consumption is 1.8 pounds of oxy- 
gen per  man-day, which would require a total of approximately 75 pounds for a.three- 
man crew on a 14-day mission. The remaining 121 pounds of ECS oxygen is provided 
fo r  cabin pressurization, leakage, and emergency return. To avoid venting, the CSS 
thermodynamic design balances the energy input caused by normal heat leak into the 
system with the energy removed because of the minimum-demand flow from the system. 
The CSS dewars, however, necessitate the use of a heat source for pressure mainte- 
nance when flow rates exceed the equilibrium flow rate. 
At gravity levels below approximately g, and with the temperature levels of 
concern here, the dominant mode of heat t ransfer  to fluids is conduction. In such an en- 
vironment, high heat ra tes  from small a r eas  can result in zones of fluid adjacent to the 
heater with significant temperature and density gradients. Such zones a r e  said to be 
thermally stratified. Vehicle accelerations can suddenly mix these thermally stratified 
zones and under some fluid conditions can result  in significant pressure decays. Ob- 
viously, forced circulation of the fluid would circumvent the potential problem of 
thermal stratification, 
The original heaters in the Apollo dewars were concentric, perforated, hollow 
aluminum spheres coated with "Electrofilm'' heaters. These heaters were rejected for 
a more positive approach that involved the use of an electric-motor-driven fan mounted 
a t  each end of a cylindrical heater element. This change reduced the weight and im- 
proved the system reliability and inflight performance. 
Cryogenic Storage System Power Requirements 
Electrical power is required for the CSS heaters,  fans, quantity probe, and sole- 
noid valves. The power requirements vary throughout the mission because of varying 
flow rates  from the tanks and changing thermodynamic conditions within the tanks. The 
quantity -probe and solenoid-valve power requirements are negligible. The heaters use 
28-volt dc bus voltage and a r e  rated a t  114.9 and 19.0 watts for the oxygen and hydrogen 
heaters, respectively. The fans use 115-volt, 400-hertz ac  f rom the spacecraft invert- 
e rs .  The hydrogen fans use 7.0 watts, and the oxygen fans that were used in the dewars 
through the Apollo 13 mission used 52.8 watts. 
System Descr iption 
The CSS comprises the elements for  the separate storage and distribution of 
oxygen and hydrogen. For flights through Apollo 13, the CSS contained two oxygen- and 
two hydrogen-storage dewars. A third oxygen dewar was added on Apollo 14 and sub- 
sequent spacecraft, and a third hydrogen dewar was added on Apollo 15 and subsequent 
spacecraft. 
These system arrangements a r e  shown schematically in figures 1, 2, and 3. The 
third tanks were required for the J-series missions on Apollo 15 and subsequent flights; 
however, the third oxygen dewar was  added f o r  redundancy on the Apollo 14 spacecraft 
after a total failure of the Apollo 1 3  oxygen system. 
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Figure 1. - Apollo 13 CSS configuration. 
12 system valve module 
Figure 2. - The CSS configuration, redesigned for Apollo 14. 
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Figure 3. - The CSS configuration, redesigned for Apollo 15. 
Under normal conditions, the dewars a r e  depleted uniformly so that, at any time 
during the mission, emergency quantities of each fluid are available in each dewar. 
Equal depletion is maintained automatically by a feature of the heater logic; however, 
the internal heaters had to be operated occasionally in the manual mode to balance the 
quantities. 
Cutaway views of both the oxygen dewar and the hydrogen dewar are shown in fig- 
Each dewar consists of an inner pressure vessel  and an outer vacuum shell with 
The 
ure  4. 
evacuated multilayer insulation in the annulus between the two concentric spheres. 
inner pressure vessel contains a capacitance probe for fluid-quantity measurement, a 
heater element to provide energy to the fluid for pressure maintenance, and temperature 
sensors  that provide an indication of bulk-fluid temperature. 
' 
The individual dewars a r e  equipped with check valves for  automatic isolation in 
the event of an external leak. Where additional dewars were installed, they were incor- 
porated into one side of the two existing parallel loops (figs. 1, 2, and 3). 
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Figure 4. - Apollo 1 3  tank designs. 
DEVELOPMENTAL DlFFl CULTIES 
Pressure Vessels 
The storage of supercritical hydrogen and oxygen required judicious selection of 
pressure-vessel materials. A materials screening program led to the selection of 
type 5A1-2.5Sn titanium alloy for the hydrogen storage and Inconel 718 alloy for the 
oxygen storage. These materials were selected because they had attractive combina- 
tions of weight, strength, ductility, and compatibility over the operating temperature 
ranges. In the early CSS program developmental stages, several titanium-alloy 
pressure-vessel problems occurred. One problem was  control of material grain size 
during the forging process, which resulted in a high rejection rate of forged parts and 
in schedule slippage. The problem w a s  attributed to a lack of adherence to accepted 
standards in temperature control of parts during forging; the problem was finally re-  
solved by changing the forging vendor. 
One hydrogen pressure vessel failed prematurely during a gaseous -nitrogen 
proof-pressure test. A failure analysis was  conducted on the vessel fragments, and it . 
was concluded that the vessel had failed because of room-temperature creep. Subse- 
quently, creep tes ts  performed on standard tensile specimens indicated that no creep 
occurred below a stress level of 75 percent of the actual yield strength. The problem 
was  resolved by increasing the pressure-vessel wall thickness from 0.032 to 0.044 inch, 
thus reducing the s t r e s s  levels below the creep threshold. This wall  thickness increase 
resulted in a working-stress level of approximately 52 percent of tensile yield strength 
based on the certified yield strength of the material. 
5 
Titanium hydride formation, growth, and spalling were found to be the cause of 
failure of the vent-disconnect welds on an early hydrogen engineering model. By sub- 
sequent analyses of other hydrogen-tank failures, the hydride formation was  found not 
to be restricted to only the vent-disconnect region, but occurred in other plumbing lines 
as well. No hydride formation was found in the pressure vessel. The problem >was 
found to be affected partially by process and procedural variables. However, optimiz- 
ing the processes only delayed the start of formation. With controlled variables, the 
life expectancy could be increased only from approximately 200 to approximately 
400 hours total exposure. The problem was finally resolved by replacing the titanium 
plumbing lines with type 304L 'stainless-steel tubing. After this change, hydrogen test 
ar t ic le  0015 was exposed to a hydrogen atmosphere for more than 2000 hours and there 
was no evidence of hydride formation. 
. 
A number of methods for joining the titanium-alloy pressure vessel  to the 
stainless-steel tubing were investigated. 
to brazing, 
indicated that coextrusion was the superior method. Subsequently, many tests were 
performed on the coextruded combination. 
service conditions. After successful testing, redesign was implemented and produc- 
tion was initiated using the coextruded transition joints with stainless -steel plumbing 
lines. Nine transition joints failed leak check after a cold shock in liquid hydrogen be- 
fore assembly, These failures were found to be caused by a fabrication process e r ro r ,  
which was subsequently corrected. The coextrusion method proved to be very success- 
ful, with the exception of one joint leak that occurred during the Apollo 12 mission (dis- 
cussed in the section of this report entitled "Flight-Hardware Problems"). 
These methods ranged from explosive bonding 
Tests of some of these types of joints under simulated service conditions 
These tests simulated both fabrication and 
Both the titanium-alloy and the Inconel pressure vessels were welded by electron- 
beam welding. An initial problem was the lack of required acceptable reliability and 
confidence levels before the process could be approved. In addition, no specifications 
o r  cri teria were available to use as reference material  in the design of the weld joints. 
Also, there were conflicts between customer requirements and the manufacturer's pro- 
jected specifications regarding the postweld treatment for stress relief. 
lems were solved by a complete and meticulously detailed test  program to qualify the 
electron-beam welding process and to prove its value as a space-age technique. 
These prob- 
I 
The significant problems in the development of the electron-beam welding process 
for this application were the machining of the joints and the preparation of the surfaces  
(because of the extremely small tolerances for gap and mismatch) and operator e r r o r  
in making the weld itself. The quality of the weld was found to be related directly to 
the experience of the electron-beam weld operator, A 0.010-inch offset of the electron 
beam from the joint could result in an incomplete fusion that, in some cases,  could not 
be detected by X-ray inspection techniques. A borescope was used for weld inspection, 
and the results of the nondestructive proof-pressure test were proof of the quality of 
the vessel, 
Heaters and Fans 
The original heaters were concentric aluminum spheres  that were perforated with 
lightening holes to reduce weight. 
that was  sprayed over the aluminum spheres. 
The heater was a high-resistance film (Electrofilm) 
This approach was rejected in favor of 
6 
the fan and heater combination, which reduced weight and provided fluid mixing. In the 
fan and heater approach, a fan was installed at each end of a perforated, cylindrical 
tube, The heater element was brazed in a "barberpole" manner around the tube, as 
shown in figure 4. The fans provided adequate mixing of the fluid to minimize stratifi- 
cation and significantly increased the ability to transfer heat. 
The electric motors used in the Apollo dewars were developed fo r  another purpose 
and adapted to this application. However, considerable effort was required in redesign, 
quality control, and contamination control before an  adequate degree of reliability was 
achieved. Among the redesign changes were an increase in air gap between the rotor 
and the stator, the addition of a sleeve over the rotor, and bearing changes. 
motors were redundant; one was mounted at each end of the heater tube. 
. 
The 
Insulation 
The insulation schemes for the Apollo dewars were developed through extensive 
analytical efforts and optimized by a comprehensive test program. The test  program 
was conducted by use of removable outer shells that were clamped together; then the 
entire assembly was placed in a vacuum chamber. This configuration permitted rapid 
modification of the test article. The results of these tests led to the conclusion that a 
vapor -cooled shield would be required to achieve the specification thermal performance. 
The vapor -cooled shield provides an intermediate cold-boundary layer within the insula- 
tion. The shield consists of a l i ye r  of 0.004-inch-thick aluminum foil, to which the 
vapor-supply line is cemented. The aluminum foil readily conducts heat, which is in- 
tercepted by the supply fluid and carr ied downstream away from the storage vessel. 
The insulation scheme that was selected consisted of alternate layers of aluminum foil, 
Dexiglas paper, and preformed fiber-glass strips. The oxygen dewar had eight se- 
quences of insulation, and the hydrogen tank had 28 sequences. One insulation sequence 
consisted of s ix  layers: three of aluminum foil (each 0.0005 inch thick), two of paper, 
and one of fiber glass. The vapor-cooled shield was placed midway between the inner 
and outer vessels. This insulation scheme was later changed in the hydrogen tanks for  
two reasons: to improve thermal performance within acceptable limits and to reduce 
weight. The first insulation scheme was  completely load bearing; that is, the total fluid 
and pressure -vessel loads were transmitted uniformly through the insulation to the outer 
shell, The method that was  used to insulate the hydrogen tanks for Block II spacecraft 
was semiload bearing; that is, s t raps  of load-bearing insulation encircled the pressure 
vessel  (contacting only a small  percentage of the pressure -vessel area) and contacted 
the outer shell  at specific points where the load was transmitted to a girth ring. Insula- 
tion interspaced between the s t raps  consisted of gold-coated H-film and a vapor -cooled ' 
shield. 
the production program, all the dewars were rated significantly better than the required.  
specification heat-leak rate. 
This design has  provided excellent thermal performance, and near the end of 
Outer Shells 
The original outer shells were chemically milled in a waffle pattern to reduce the 
outer-shell weight. This approach was  deleted and a monocoque outer shell was adopted, 
primarily because of manufacturing costs. The first monocoque outer shells were 
7 
0.012 inch thick and had buckling problems. Subsequently, the thickness was increased 
to 0.020 inch, and better contour-tolerance control was implemented. 
Adequate thermal performance of insulation is dependent upon achieving and main- 
taining a pressure level within the insulation to minimize gas conduction, Normally, 
the insulation is evacuated at an elevated temperature to boil off residual surface gases. 
When the insulation cools, a stable vacuum of 1 X t o r r  o r  lower is achieved. 
During Block II qualification tests, it was found that vibration caused a degradation 
in  the vacuum level. This problem was corrected by the installation of Vac-Ion pumps 
on the outer shells of all tanks. 
taining a good vacuum, and they also provide a check on the annulus vacuum level. 
Previously, thermal-performance degradation could be checked only after servicing 
with the cryogenic fluid. The Vac-Ion pump package consists of a 1-liter/sec vacuum 
pump and a high-voltage-output dc-to-dc converter. The converter high-voltage output 
is supplied to  the Vac-Ion pump through shielded high-voltage wires. 
The Vac-Ion pumps have proved successful in main- 
Most of the problems associated with the Vac-Ion pump package were of a random 
nature and usually occurred because of improper handling on the par t  of tcperators. 
However, one major problem occurred: electromagnetic interference (emi) caused by 
corona conditions in the converter, This problem was first discovered at NASA Kennedy 
Space Center before the launching of the Apollo 7 mission. By pulling various compo- 
nent fuses, the problem was isolated to the Vac-Ion pump package. The Vac-Ion pump 
packages were emi tested in a vacuum chamber, and air-leak paths from high-voltage 
areas were present in both the pump and the converter potting. At altitude, leakage 
through these paths causes corona conditions. Development of better. vacuum-potting 
techniques allowed the pumps to be requalified for flight. 
FLI GHT-HARDWARE PROBLEMS 
Only three flight problems that occurred in the CSS are considered significant 
enough to report here. These problems occurred on Apollo flights 9, 12, and 13. In 
addition, the performance of the CSS during the Apollo 14 mission is discussed because 
Apollo 14 was the first flight to use the redesigned oxygen dewars following the oxygen- 
tank failure on Apollo 13. 
Apollo 9 
During the Apollo 9 flight, a failure occurred in the automatic pressure-control 
The pressure -control system, shown schematically in system of the hydrogen tank. 
figure 5, primarily consists of two pressure switches, one in each tank system. These 
switches are  installed in a series-parallel arrangement with a motor switch and the as- 
sociated circuitry. The logic of this system is that both pressure  switches must close 
to activate the heaters; however, the opening of one pressure switch will deactivate the 
heaters, The first indication of failure occurred at a ground elapsed time (g. e. t. ) of 
93 hours, when the heaters failed to activate at the lower limit of 225 psia. At this 
time, the heaters in hydrogen tank 1 were in "AUTO" and the hydrogen tank 2 heaters 
8 
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Figure 5. - Schematic of the hydrogen 
tank automatic pressure-control 
system. 
were "OFF. '' This failure could have been 
caused by either of the pressure switches o r  
the motor switch failing to close. 
tank 2 heaters then were placed in the AUTO 
position with no effect, and the tank pres- 
sures decayed to approximately 210 psia. 
At this time (95:43 g. e. t.), the tank 2 fans 
were turned on to arrest the pressure decay, 
The fans in tank 2 were then turned off at 
100:13 g. e. t. When the lunar module was 
undocked (101:22 g. e. t. ), the tank heaters 
came on and pressurized the tanks to ap- 
proximately 270 psia. The automatic cut- 
off point was  passed, and the crewmen were 
required to deactivate the heaters. This 
failure mode requires that both pressure 
switches fail closed o r  that the motor switch 
fail to open. It should be noted that this sec-  
ond failure mode is in conflict with the first 
failure mode. 
The 
Because there are three components 
in series (two pressure switches and one 
motor switch), there is no possibility to 
identify positively which component failed. 
Because the second failure would have required thatboth pressure switches fail closed, 
there is reason to believe that there was a probable intermittent failure of the motor 
.switch o r  its circuitry. 
As a result of the automatic-pressure -control-system fa ih re ,  the hydrogen- 
system pressure was controlled by operating the fans in a manual mode throughout the 
remainder of the mission. This manual mode w a s  the recommended contingency pro- 
cedure, and no constraints to the mission resulted from this type of operation. 
During the postflight investigation, a determination was made that terminal board 
number 9 (part number MD417-0018-0001) had 16-gage wire to supply the motor switch 
with power. There w a s  a history of one intermittent-type failure using this type of ter-  
minal board with 16-gage wire. An intermittent open failure between selected pins could 
have been responsible for  both the closed and the open modes of failure. During the in- 
vestigation of the 16-gage-wire terminal boards, a discrepancy was found in the manu- 
facturing process and corrective actions were instituted. Additionally, the suspect 
boards were removed from the program on a criticality basis, and this problem never 
recurred. 
. 
Apollo 12 
During the Apollo 1 2  cryogenic loading, approximately 51 hours before the sched- 
uled launch, the performance of hydrogen tank 2 was found to be unacceptable because 
the tank filled much slower than normal and had a higher than normal boiloff rate during 
the thermal stabilization period. By visual inspection of the tank, a thick layer of frost  
9 
was noted on the tank exterior, indicating a loss  of vacuum in the annulus. The tank 
was replaced with a tank from the Apollo 1 3  spacecraft, and cryogenic loading was com- 
pleted satisfactorily. 
A failure analysis, performed before launch, resulted in  identification of the 
cause of the vacuum loss: a leak in the bimetallic titanium/stainless-steel transition 
joint. The leak resulted from an incomplete bond in the joint, which permitted hydrogen 
to leak from the inner tank into the annulus. Investigation revealed that improper in- 
spection of the bimetallic joint during manufacture had allowed voids between the metal 
surfaces to pass unnoticed. The failed joint was manufactured in lot 3B, and lot 3A 
also was suspected of having poor-quality joints. The reason for this suspicion was 
the random location of the joints in the lots that failed the inspection process. These 
failures had escaped detection under the quality system that was in use at the time and, 
as a result, they were not reported. Only four other tanks f rom these two lots remained 
in the program; these tanks were recalled for replacement of the questionable bimetallic 
joints. 
, 
. 
The following corrective actions were taken to ensure that no more bad joints 
would pass inspection. 
1. A special chemical and inclusion analysis was conducted for the raw material. 
2. Metallurgical samples were taken from the ends and middle of each billet. . 
3. A new ultrasonic inspection against a standard was instituted. 
4. A l l  failures were to be reported and examined fo r  their lot location. 
Apollo 13 
During the Apollo 1 3  mission, oxygen tank 2 failed at 55: 53: 20 hours into the mis- 
sion and subsequently caused the loss  of the complete cryogenic oxygen system. The 
mission was aborted and the crewmen were returned safely. To solve this problem, an 
Accident Investigation Board was formed. Based on flight analysis and ground test data, 
the board reached the following conclusions: 
1. Two protective tank-heater thermal switches failed closed during an abnormal 
detanking procedure used on the pad. The failed switches allowed continuous ground- 
support equipment (GSE) heater power to be applied, which led to severe damage of the 
fan-motor wire insulation. 
2. The failure of the thermal switches was caused by a design incompatibility 
between the switches and the GSE power. 
3. The detanking problem that occurred during the countdown demonstration test 
was the result of loose or misalined fill-line plumbing components within the tank. 
4. A f i re  was started by electrical short  circuits in  the wiring to the fan motors 
inside oxygen tank 2 shortly after the fan circuits were energized f o r  the seventh time. 
1 0  
5. Burning of the insulation proceeded for approximately 80 seconds before 
reaching the pressure-vessel electrical conduit, through which all electrical tank wiring 
passes. The heat from the burning insulation-first caused failure of the Inconel conduit 
and ultimately led to the failure of the vacuum dome and to separation of the bay IV 
structural panel. 
6. The internal component design of the tank is such that possible damage can go 
undetected. Furthermore, the plumbing parts have tolerance allowables that can build 
up so that normal detanking is prevented. 
, 
7. The design of the warning system for indicating the position of the reactant 
valves to the fuel cells does not allow detection of individual valve closures to any fuel 
cell, a condition that existed during this incident. 
A s  a result of the Apollo 13 failure, the cryogenic oxygen dewar w a s  redesigned 
to include the following items. 
1. The fan motors were removed to minimize the amount of combustible mate- 
rials within the dewar and to reduce potential ignition sources. 
2. The Teflon-insulated wire was replaced with stainless- steel-encased wire 
with refrasil (SOz) and magnesium oxide (MgO) insulation to minimize the amount of 
combustible materials within the 'dewar. 
3. The five-piece f i l l  tube was replaced with a single tube. 
4. A temperature sensor was  added to monitor the heater temperature. 
5. The internal filter was placed external to the tank. 
6. The bulk-fluid temperature sensor was relocated in the boss area (fig. 6). 
These changes are illustrated in figure 7 and, as can be seen, few components were un- 
affected. In addition, the oxygen reactant valves were replaced with valves that con- 
tained no Teflon. 
Because the fan motors were deleted from the tanks, the thermal performance of 
the heater depends to a large extent on the effective gravity level. This occurs because 
the heat from the heater must be transferred to the fluid primarily by natural convec- 
tive processes. Obviously, the conditions that dominate these processes cannot be du- 
plicated in a terrestrial environment. This problem, together with the fact that the 
first flight of this new system would be a lunar mission, dictated that extensive analysis; 
checkout, and testing programs be conducted. The analytical effort required by this re- 
design was concentrated on the stratification and heat transfer in low-gravity (10-6g 
to 1om8g) levels. 
. 
Because of the technical r isk involved with the fan-motor removal, a parallel ap- 
proach was  taken. An external pump to circulate and mix the oxygen was designed and 
qualified. This pump was  designed with a magnetic coupling so that none of the elec- 
tr ical  components were in contact with the oxygen. 
11 
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Figure 6. - Fluid temperature (02) 
electrical connector. 
removed for clarity) 
Figure 7. - Redesigned Apollo 14 
oxygen tank. 
Because of the open issue of forced convection at low densities, a third tank was 
added to the Apollo 14 system to ensure that, even in the event of a failure of one of the 
tanks, a return could be made without entering fluid density regions that had not been 
previously encountered in flight with no fan-motor operation. A flight demonstration 
test was  conducted during the Apollo 14 mission, and the subsequent analysis resulted 
in the following conclusions. 
1. The alternate design approach using an external circulation pump is not r e -  
quired on Apollo 15 and subsequent spacecraft. 
2. Large thermal gradients exist on the heater, and the specific temperature 
profiles are  strong functions of gravity level. 
3. The location of heater-temperature sensors  is crit ical  in flight systems. 
4. Stratification does not affect the thermal efficiency of the system. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The successful development of the Apollo cryogenic storage system resulted in 
significant technological developments for cryogenic applications, particularly in fabr i -  
cation and welding of pressure -vessel shells, metallurgy associated with titanium creep 
and hydride formation, application of bimetallic joints, application of vapor -cooled 
shields in high -performance insulation, and vacuum acquisition and retention. Most of 
these advances a r e  directly applicable to other required cryogenic developmental pro - 
grams,  such as the space shuttle. 
12 
Additionally, the results of preflight analytical predictions, flight data, and sub- 
sequent analytical correlations have contributed much data on heat transfer and stratifi- 
cation of cryogens at low-gravity levels. Analytical tools have been developed and 
correlated with flight data to such an extent that a high degree of confidence now exists 
in  the analytical approaches. 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, November 12, 1972 
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